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Abstract 
 
Traditionally, verification methods for security 
protocols typically assume that the protocols are used 
in isolation of other protocols (i.e., there is only a 
single protocol using a network at a given time). 
However, in practice it is unrealistic to assume that a 
security protocol runs in isolation in an insecure 
network. A multi-protocol attack is an attack in which 
more than one protocol is involved. The verification 
methods for security protocols that assume a single 
protocol on a network will fail to verify a protocol’s 
resistance/vulnerability to multi-protocol attacks. 
Further, multiple security protocols that are verified to 
be correct in isolation can be susceptible to multi-
protocol attacks when used over the same network. 
However, the verification of security properties for 
multiple protocols existing on the same network is 
difficult since security properties are not 
compositional. This paper surveys some of the recent 
approaches and contributions into the verification of 
security properties in the context of multiple protocols 
being run in an insecure network and the efforts to 
prevent multi-protocol attacks.                    
 
 
Keywords:  Multi-protocol attack, chosen-protocol 
attack, protocol compositionality, security, verification, 
specification.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Identifying and verifying the security properties and 
assumptions that may affect the security of protocols in 
insecure network is one of the most difficult design 
problems. Also to note, keys involved in the protocol 
are mainly assumed to be secured via some other 
protocol It is very realistic to expect in real world 
scenarios that multiple users will be likely to have the 
same public/private key pairs for lot of their 
interactions with different systems. 
Traditionally, verification methods for security 
protocols assume that the protocols are used in 
isolation of others (i.e., there is only a single protocol 
using a network at a given time, known as a mono-
protocol system). Yet, in practice it is unrealistic to 
assume that a security protocol will run in isolation in 
an insecure network. Many protocols may be secure 
when executed in isolation, but there are possibilities in 
which they may lose their secure properties when 
executed in parallel with other protocols. Further, [12] 
claims: 
 
Given a (provably) correct security protocol, there exists another 
correct security protocol, such that their composition is incorrect. 
 
 However, the verification of security properties for 
multiple protocols existing on the same network is 
difficult since security properties are not 
compositional. That is, any verification for multi-
protocol systems must ensure that each protocol should 
not interact in a harmful manner with the other 
protocols used in the system [17].   
A protocol used to break secure protocols is termed 
the chosen protocol, and this attack is called a chosen 
protocol attack. A multi-protocol attack is an attack in 
which more than one protocol is involved. A multi-
protocol attack typically interleaves messages using 
two different protocols to target one of them. The 
protocol under attack is compromised by one of the 
following [1]:  
 
• An incidental collision with another protocol 
• A deliberately tailored protocol 
 
A multi-protocol attack can affect users using the same 
computer or smart card. Note, in literature and 
throughout this paper, the terms “multi-protocol attack” 
and “chosen protocol attack” are used interchangeably. 
This paper surveys and presents some of the recent 
approaches and contributions into the verification of 
security properties in the context of multi-protocol 
attacks. 
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 defines a multi-protocol attack as per the 
research literature. After discussing generalities, 
several specific examples of a multi-protocol attack are 
given in Section 3. In Sections 4 and 5, several 
proposed specification and verification techniques 
addressing multi-protocol attacks are discussed. 
Section 6 provides a brief summary of the proposed 
preventative steps for a multi-protocol attack. Section 7 
discusses various aspects addressed in the literature 
that appear to render the chosen protocol attack. 
Finally, Section 8 provides some concluding remarks.  
 
2. Protocol Interactions and Multi-Protocol 
Attacks 
 
Protocol interactions occur when some information 
from a protocol, P, can allow an adversary to mount an 
attack over another protocol, Q. For example, a replay 
attack over one protocol using the messages from 
another protocol, assuming the protocols are of the 
same form. Protocol interactions reduce to the subset of 
possible attacks on the protocol, as in the man-in-the-
middle attack above. Ways in which two different 
protocols may interact include:  
 
• Third party may observe the messages in P, 
and attack using Q  
• a user, C, impersonating another user, B, to a 
third user, A, using P to get information. In 
parallel, C uses the information as B with C 
using protocol Q 
• C interacts as a legitimate user with B using 
protocol P, and simultaneously attack A as B 
in protocol P. As long as the attack on either P 
or Q is made possible, the protocols interact 
 
 A chosen-protocol is an existing (or tailor-made) 
protocol designed (may be specifically) to interact with 
some already-running secure protocol, called the target 
protocol. The chosen protocol, the protocol used to 
attack the target protocol, remains secure in isolation, 
but allows an attack on the target protocol. To build 
such a protocol, if there are no restrictions on the 
allowed steps, consider a target protocol that uses a 
private key to sign and decrypt. Then, any protocol that 
gives the attacker a decryption oracle and a signing 
oracle will compromise the target protocol as long as 
both the chosen and target protocols share the same 
key. 
There is no fixed definition of what a reasonable 
chosen protocol should be, but this does not prove such 
a protocol could not exist. Any protocol that is not 
susceptible to message-based attacks is highly likely to 
be immune to a multi-protocol attack, but still it is not 
complete. The following provides some realistic 
scenarios for multi-protocol attacks: 
 
1. Different products and protocols may use the 
same cryptographic keys 
2.  Infiltration of lower-security products’ 
protocols may not be as carefully overseen as 
those of higher-security protocols 
3.  Custom-modified protocols used in commercial 
products may be used to install a chosen 
protocol for this class of attack: such protocols 
may end up being adopted later on as a widely-
used standard 
 
3. Multi-Protocol Attack Examples 
 
This section describes four examples of a multi-
protocol attack including: attacks against public-key 
signatures, attacks against a symmetric-key 
authentication protocol, attacks against the Distributed 
Authentication Security Service (DASS) public-key 
protocol, and attacks against combined services. 
   
3.1. Attacks Against Public-Key Signatures 
 
Based on the draft SSL-3 protocol [21], a target 
protocol, as shown in Figure 1, is constructed. Using an 
RSA certificate, a server, B, authenticates itself to 
establish master encryption key pairs (K-public, K’-
private) for subsequent communication. The protocol 
then proceeds as follows: 
 
1.  Client A sends hello message to server B that 
contains a list of possible cryptographic and 
compression routines along with an initial 
random number. 
2. Server B responds with a server hello message 
that contains information similar to the client 
hello message, except that it indicates specific 
cryptographic and compression routines to be 
used. 
3.  Server B then sends a copy of its certificate(s) 
(e.g., X.509 certificates) to client A.  
4.  In this version of the protocol, B then sends to 
A a plain text copy of a temporary RSA public 
key (i.e., a modulus and exponent pair) and a 
signed hash of that key.   
5. The server, B, then sends a server hello done 
message to A. 
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6. The client, A, sends a secret message (i.e., a pre-
master key) encrypted with the server’s 
temporary RSA public key. 
7. The server responds with a server finished 
message that is a hash of the exchanged 
information encrypted with the values just 
negotiated. 
 
 
Figure 1. Proposed SSL-Like Target Protocol 
 
The client uses the server’s certificate and the 
signed hash to authenticate the origin of the temporary 
public key. Thus, an attacker who tries to replay an old 
Message 4 from the server will not be able to read 
Message 6 from the client. 
 
 
Figure 2. Tailored Protocol 
 
Figure 2 shows a protocol, which may be designed 
by an application programmer or provided by a 
network service, to develop a certified message receipt 
mechanism, or it could be a protocol deliberately 
tailored to break other authentication protocols. This 
protocol consists of the following two steps: 
 
1. A sends some data value, M, to B encrypted by 
B’s RSA public key 
2. B responds to A with its signature (in terms of 
hash) which is encrypted by B’s RSA private 
key PKS(B) to authenticate receipt of the first 
message 
 
It is acceptable to believe that similar forms of 
messages can occur in different secure protocols. Note 
that the tailored protocol obtains a signature of a server 
for any of the given data. The attacker can use this 
protocol to break the SSL-like protocol. For example, 
as shown in Figure 3, an attacker can obtain the 
server’s signature over any of its temporary RSA public 
keys using a tailored protocol. An attacker can replay 
the same message in an SSL-like protocol 
masquerading as the valid server, since Message 4 is 
used to authenticate the server’s message. Since the 
attacker can now use the temporary RSA key it created, 
it can see any messages sent by A to a server, where the 
attacker acts as a valid server.  
Similarly, an attack can be raised over a modified 
Agora protocol [9], which is commonly used as an 
electronic payment protocol [9].  
 
 
Figure 3. attack over SSL-like protocol 
 
3.2. Attacks Against Symmetric-Key 
Authentication Protocols 
 
Consider the symmetric key based simple secure 
protocol MAP1:  
 
 
Also consider the two tailored protocols EVE1, 
EVE2: 
 
 
Below, we can see how the EVE1 protocol can be 
exploited to attack the MAP1 protocol at one side in 
the following: 
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Similarly, we can see how the EVE2 protocol can 
be exploited to attack the MAP1 protocol at the other 
side in the following: 
 
 
 
3.3. Attacks Against the Distributed 
Authentication Security Service Public-Key 
Protocol 
 
The Distributed Authentication Security Service 
(DASS) is a commercial protocol for mutual 
authentication and key exchange developed by Digital 
Equipment Corporation and marketed in a product 
called SPX [18]. 
 
Protocol E: DASS (the Target Protocol) [18]. 
 
A chosen protocol is built by adding some 
additional functionality to the system. In this case, to 
have Trent generate random public keys, a new 
protocol must be added as needed.  
 
Protocol F: Protocol for Requesting a Temporary 
Public Key (the Chosen Protocol) 
 
The attack then proceeds as follows: 
 
1. Alice forms 
• R0 = a random number the same length as an 
ID, and sends to Trent 
• M0 = Request for PK; IDA;R0: 
2. Trent generates a new public key, PKT , forms 
• K1 = a random encryption key, and sends 
back 
• M1 = PKEPKA(K1);EK1 (SKT ); SIGNSKT (R0; 
PKT ): 
 
A man-in-the-middle attack between Bob and Trent 
can be raised using the chosen protocol. Choosing R0 to 
be some person's ID, then use the signed block to 
convince Bob that it is the right public key. Thus, this 
protocol is as follows: 
 
1. Mallory selects 
• R0 = IDA, and sends to Trent 
• M0 = Request for PK; IDM;R0. 
2. Trent generates a new public key, PKT , forms 
• K1 = a random encryption key, and sends 
back to Mallory 
• M1 = PKEPKM (K1);EK1 (SKT ); SIGNSKT 
(R0; PKT ) 
3. Mallory now encrypts a random session key 
under Bob's public key, including the 
timestamp, key lifetime, and Alice's ID. All this 
is exactly as appears in the third message of 
DASS 
4.  Bob sends IDA to Trent 
5.  Mallory intercepts this request. She sends back 
SIGNSKT (R0; PKT ), recovered from the second 
message in the chosen protocol 
6. Bob decrypts this message, and uses PKT to 
verify the signature on the first message sent to Bob. 
Bob is now convinced he shares a secret symmetric key 
with Alice, when in fact, he shares it with Mallory 
instead. 
 
3.4. Attacks on Combined Services 
 
Figure 4. Different Services with Different Secure Protocols 
 
This section provides an example of a multi-protocol 
attack over combined services that use different 
protocols but still interact. Figure 4 and 5 provides an 
example of such an attack.  In figure .4, the Protocol P 
be any protocol used for authenticating partners and 
generating fresh shared secret. Service 1, is an 
extended protocol as shown. Provided Protocol P is 
secure, we can also prove that Service 1 protocol is 
correct. Let the Service 2 be another protocol which 
reuses the same protocol P, but we extend it by sending 
a fresh session identifier x (generated by P) and some 
message m.  
If we run Service 1 in parallel with Service 2, the 
combined protocols are broken as shown in Figure 5. 
In this attack, the intruder simply re-routes the initial 
messages from Service 1 to Service 2. After this initial 
phase, a is halfway into Service 1, and b is halfway into 
Service 2. Therefore b will now use the random value x 
as a session identifier, effectively revealing it to the 
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intruder. Then, when a uses this value x as a session 
key for the secret Y, the intruder can decrypt it. Thus 
the security claim of Service 1 is violated. 
 
 
Figure 5. Multi-Protocol Combined Service Attack 
 
4. Specification of Security Protocols 
 
When a security protocol is formally specified, it is 
common to specify its requirements when it runs in 
isolation. This is connected to the way verification 
proceeds. Assumptions under which the protocol 
remains correct (when composed with other protocols) 
can be specified. 
Consider a protocol for a secret session key 
generation and distribution, a protocol typically used 
for authenticating and maintaining the secrecy of the 
sequence of messages. It is assumed that, after the key 
generation phase, the key remains secret. The key 
generation protocol does not have a goal or property 
for maintaining the secrecy of the key after the protocol 
ends. However, usage of the session key in some other 
protocol paralleled with maintenance of the key 
secretly makes the key generation protocol useful and 
sensible.  
Many design decisions are made based on the 
composition of protocols. Hence, most of the protocols 
currently used are not meant to be executed in 
isolation. Thus, it is important and acceptable to make 
these assumptions on the environment explicit.  
Current protocol specifications and formal 
semantics are not well developed or well suited to 
express the assumptions (which have to be considered 
explicitly in this environment). Ways of expressing the 
exact requirements of a protocol are required. For 
example, rules on how the session key is to be used, 
assumptions about an existing public/private key 
infrastructure, introducing some proof obligations for 
the resulting composed system, etc.  
Expressing the specifications, properties, and 
requirements in a concise way is an important research 
challenge. Once such requirements in the context of 
protocols can be specified, small protocols can be 
considered as building blocks for larger composed 
protocols. Another level of abstraction can be 
introduced once a set of small protocols are properly 
specified to serve as building blocks [7]. 
 
5. Model Checking and Verification 
Techniques for Multi-Protocol Systems 
 
Very little work has specifically examined the 
formal verification of security properties in multi-
protocol systems [17]. This is mainly because the 
problem of protocol composability has been presented 
as one of the most challenging issues faced in formal 
methods (which are applied to protocol verification of 
multi-protocol systems) [16]. This section discusses 
recent work in formal methods in modeling checking 
and other suggested verification techniques to analyze 
multi-protocol attacks in multi-protocol systems.   
  
5.1 Model Checking  
 
Panti et. al. [17] extended a verification 
methodology that was originally used for security 
protocols in isolation to analyze multi-protocol systems 
using the NuSMV model checker. To model a multi-
protocol system as a collection of finite state machines 
in NuSMV, the following must be described in the 
model: 
  
• The behaviors toward the given protocols of 
participating non-malicious agents  
• The behaviors of the malicious agents that acts 
to compromise the protocols 
• The communication channel used by all the 
agents to exchange the messages 
 
Each non-malicious agent, X, in the multi-protocol 
system can participate using different protocols, Pi, and 
play different roles using the same protocol or different 
protocols, Pj. For example, X, may play a customer role 
in a session of Pi and be a merchant in a session of Pj. 
If trusted third parties are involved (e.g., authentication 
servers, payment gateways, etc.), they must only act in 
a third party role using a single protocol. The roles are 
all classified in one of the following two categories: 
 
• Initiators (init) – those roles that start a 
protocol execution 
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• Responders (resp) – those roles that are 
engaged in a protocol execution by an initiator 
 
Modeling a malicious agent, I, requires the 
identification and documentation of relevant 
assumptions such as: 
• I is considered a legitimate member of the 
system 
• I has the same capabilities as the non-malicious 
users of the multi-protocol system 
• I can send and receive messages according to 
all protocols in Pi 
• I can be as powerful as possible (to allow for 
the verification of the protocol assuming a 
worst case scenario) 
• I may have complete control over the 
communication channel: 
o Ability to eavesdrop on all the messages 
sent over the communication channel 
from any agent to any agent within the 
system 
o Ability to store messages eavesdropped 
from the communication channel in its 
memory 
o Ability to remove a message sent over the 
communication channel from any agent to 
any agent within the system 
o Ability to send messages to agents of the 
system impersonating any agent of the 
system (even itself) 
 
For a multi-protocol system to be verified using 
such a model-checking approach, the following 
security properties are vital [17]: 
 
• Authentication – the parties convince each 
other of their identities 
• Confidentiality – nobody but the authorized 
parties must know a term 
• Integrity – a term must not be altered by an 
unauthorized agent 
 
To formalize these three security properties, [17] 
introduces a correspondence property to generalize 
and capture these properties for the use of formal 
verification. The correspondence property is as 
follows: 
 
If an event, E, occurs n times, then another event, F, must have 
occurred at least n times. 
 
and can be represented as a CTL property in NuSMV 
as follows: 
 
AG(x.counterF >= Y.counterE) 
Authentication is represented as the following 
properties, expressed in CTL in NuSMV: 
 
AG(x.begin(Pi,init,Y) >= Y.end(Pi,resp,X)) 
 
AG(x.begin(Pi,resp,Y) >= Y.end(Pi,int,X)) 
 
Confidentiality is represented as the following 
properties, expressed in CTL in NuSMV: 
 
AG(x.send(Pi,I,term) >= I.receive(Pi,X,term)) 
 
AG(x.send(Pi,Y,term) >= Y.receive(Pi,X,term)) 
 
Integrity for a confidential term is expressed in CTL 
in NuSMV as 
 
AG(x.send(Pi,I,term) >= I.receive(Pi,X,term)) 
 
AG(x.send(Pi,Y,term) >= Y.receive(Pi,X,term)) 
 
However, integrity for terms transmitted in clear text is 
only expressed as  
 
AG(x.send(Pi,Y,term) >= Y.receive(Pi,X,term)) 
 
in CTL in NuSMV. 
Panti et. al. [17] used such a model to verify these 
security properties over a series of multi-protocol 
systems, shown in Table 1, including analyzing the 
interactions in the following groups: the Neeham-
Schroeder public-key protocol (NS) and the Signed 
Receipt protocol; the Agora protocol [9] and the Age 
Verification protocol; the SET Purchase protocol, the 
SET Authorization protocol, the SET Payment Phase 
protocol, and the 2KP Payment Phase protocol. 
Their modeling approach was able to identify 
known security vulnerabilities in the interaction of the 
NS and Signed Receipt protocols as well as the Agora 
and Age Verification protocols [9]. In addition, it 
discovered an unknown vulnerability in the interaction 
of the Agora and Age Verification protocols. For the 
SET Purchase protocol, the SET Authorization 
protocol, the SET Payment Phase protocol, and the 
2KP Payment Phase protocols, their modeling 
approach verified the previously described security 
properties.  
Also of significance, this approach produces results, 
as the authors claim, in an encouragingly efficient 
manner. In the best case, their approach needed about 
one hour to verify the Agora and Age Verification 
protocols that had nearly 27 million states. In the worst 
case, their approach required approximately three days 
to verify a system with a state-space having nearly 1028 
states. 
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Table 1. Protocol List 
 
 
 
5.2 Verification Techniques  
Cremers and Mauw [7] proposed a generic 
canonical model for the analysis of security protocols. 
Their model gives static requirements for valid 
protocols and is parametric with respect to the 
matching function and the intruder’s network 
capabilities. Specifically, to analyze a multi-protocol 
system, this work simply adds additional role 
descriptions to the model for each additional protocol 
or for each additional protocol role. The security 
properties to be verified in a multi-protocol system are 
defined as local claims and local constants are utilized 
and bound to runs, assisting in the construction of 
proofs to the security properties.   
Like [7], [17], describes the behavior of a protocol 
in terms of its roles: either an initiator or a responder. 
A multi-protocol system contains a number of 
communicating agents (entities) that may take on one 
or more roles. A role performed by an agent is called a 
run. Thus, an agent, A, may perform two initiator runs 
and one responder run in parallel. Each run executed 
by an agent of the system is meant to achieve some 
security goal. For example, the agent may desire the 
confidential exchange of a message to another agent 
during a run. While an agent is pursuing a security goal 
in a run, an intruder may try to oppose such a security 
goal. An intruder’s capabilities determine its strength 
in attacking a protocol run. Using this general 
description, [7] constructs a global description of a 
security model consisting of the following components: 
  
• Protocol specification – describes the 
behavior of each of the roles in the protocol, 
most often as a sequential list of events 
• Agent model – a model of the agents that 
execute the roles of the protocol based on a 
closed world assumption (i.e., the description 
of an honest agent that only includes the 
behavior of the agent as described in the 
protocol specification) 
• Communication model – describes how the 
messages between the agents are exchanged (in 
an asynchronous manner) 
• Threat model – a parameter in the  semantics 
of the model (to accommodate all types of 
network communications and threats, e.g., 
wireless communication) based on Dolev and 
Yao’s network threat model [19] 
• Cryptographic primitives – idealized 
mathematical constructs (e.g., encryption) 
using a black-box approach to only describe the 
relevant properties 
• Security requirements – expressed as safety 
properties 
 
Note, the work described in [19] only considers 
secrecy and authentication as security properties to 
validate.  
 
 
Figure 6. SOS Rules  
 
Figure 6 details the formal derivation rules for a 
system. The create rule details that a new run can only 
be created if its run identifier has yet to be used. The 
send rule states that if a run executes a send event, the 
sent message is added to the output buffer and the 
executing run can proceed to the next event. The read 
rule determines when an input event can be executed. 
The claim rule express that an enabled claim event can 
always be executed.  
Figure 7 details the some of the formal intruder 
rules used. The transmit rule describes the transmission 
of a message from the output buffer to the input buffer 
without interference from an intruder. The deflect rules 
says that an intruder with deflection capabilities can 
delete any message from the output buffer. The inject 
rule describes that the injection of any message 
inferable form the intruder’s knowledge into an input 
buffer. The eavesdrop message details how an intruder 
can learn a message during the transmission between 
two agents. The jam rule states that an intruder can 
read the deflected messages and add it to its 
knowledge. 
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Figure 7. Network/Intruder Rules  
 
 
6. Prevention Design Techniques 
 
This section points out the viable environment for 
attack and prevention techniques. The three conditions 
that enable these attacks are [1], [5]:   
 
1.  Use of private/public key in more than one 
protocol or various services which use different 
protocols. 
2.  Chosen protocol (tailored or authentic) should 
be installed on the target machine and should 
have access to cryptographic services used by 
the target protocol. 
3.  Presence of matching patterns: this result in 
type flow attacks. 
 
 The mitigation of these attacks through additional 
requirements/specifications placed upon a security 
system is possibly a viable solution to preventing multi-
protocol attacks. The remainder of this section 
discusses how to thwart these attacks. Kelsey, Schneier, 
and Wagner [12] presented five design principles for 
protocols that appear to render the chosen protocol 
attack impossible, but [3] and [15] claim that these five 
principles alone do not suffice to ensure the prevention 
of multi-protocol attack unless there is strong 
underlying support for such mechanisms. To address 
condition 1, and principle 1, use of a public key to a 
specific set of protocols should be limited. To 
summarize: 
 
• Limiting the scope of the key reduces the 
impact addressed in the first condition above. 
Implementation of this restriction is not cost 
effective, and the commercial market does not 
restrict the use of certified keys. As long as the 
application has a handle for the key, it can use 
it. The API's have to be designed to securely 
manage key use. 
• Unique protocol identifiers in the PKI 
certificate, along with universal protocol 
numbering and a secure mechanism should be 
included for a protocol implementation to 
prove to the system that it indeed implements 
the specified protocol. However, this will not 
be sufficient if the tailored protocol doesn’t 
follow this step. 
• Include a fixed unique identifier in a fixed 
place in the authenticated protocol.  
• A malicious user application can use 
subroutines in the protocol to implement any 
tailored protocol. Support for protocol 
validation in a cryptographic subsystem should 
be provided. Unfortunately, this forces all 
protocols to be installed within the 
cryptographic subsystem. 
• Mapping the unique identifier to encryption 
forces the identifier to be used for successful 
decryption. Blind signing of protocols can be 
prevented from being used to decrypt secret 
messages.  
• Cryptographic subsystem support for key 
limitations, where the user specifies which 
protocols can use the specified keys. This 
places a large portion of the burden on the user, 
who needs to understand the full ramifications 
of key sharing. 
• Use the certified public key to certify new 
public keys that are generated for a single use 
(as in [18]). The certified public key is then 
used in only the key distribution protocol, and 
each new public key is used only once. A 
multi-protocol attack may still be possible 
depending on the content and format of the 
newly distributed public-key certificate. 
• Each run of the protocol should be identified 
uniquely, in conjunction with the cryptographic 
subsystem support (ID should be provided by 
subsystem and not by protocol user); otherwise 
a protocol can be tailored to use the same 
identifiers.  
• Validation of flaw-free composition of groups 
of protocols (all possible combination should 
be considered which could form a complete 
system, not just 2-protocol compositions)  
• Smartcard or user device support.  
 
Multi-protocol attacks will still be possible if these 
restrictions and conditions are not enforced and 
validated [15]. 
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7. Discussion – The Feasibility of a Multi-
Protocol Attack 
 
Analysis of cryptographic protocols can be 
described in terms of a single sequence of messages, 
but they are actually implemented as a suite of sub-
protocols. It is necessary to show that the sub-protocols 
do not interact in a way conducive to multi-protocol or 
other attacks.  
Multi-protocol attacks are not only a theoretical 
concern. The early version of SSL reveals part of the 
key, it was not always clear by inspection of the key 
whether weak or strong cryptography was being used; 
thus allowing a multi-protocol attack [1], [2]. This 
serves the example for a confusion of the reconnection 
protocol with the connection protocol, which can lead 
to an attack.  
Although the problems addressed in [1], [5] and 
[18] do not necessarily occur as often as other types of 
flaws [5], [6], they are prevalent enough that it is 
important to demonstrate the collection of protocols is 
free from insecure interactions. But it is very hard to 
show all the possible interactions that are secure in the 
combination of protocols. [1], [12] have shown it is 
possible to build an attack protocol for a given 
protocol. It is necessary at least to demonstrate that a 
suite of protocols will not accept message sent by 
another protocol. This has a serious practical impact on 
the verification of cryptographic protocols [3], [6]. 
Heintze’s work [11] on composability concentrated 
on determining under what conditions protocols could 
be guaranteed to be composable with each other. More 
recent work [7], [17] has concentrated on taking each 
state transition that required an input message and 
determining which transitions could produce output 
identifying such attacks.  The authors have taken 
initiatives for the specification, verification, and model 
checking for such kinds of attacks. 
Thayer and Guttman [10] used Strand Space to 
show the secure composition and to analyze the 
properties. They used generation of unique terms for 
each protocol used in combination, and proved 
combination of protocols are secure. The authors 
extended their work by guaranteeing security by the 
usage of restricted exceptions. Work on Mixed Strand 
Space showed the extension towards specific 
applications. In particular, [8], [13] have shown 
theoretically that any protocol that is secure in isolation 
remains secure even in case of composition, provided 
that all the assumptions and properties specified by 
each protocol holds good after composition. In [13], 
authors also suggests that multi-protocol attack will not 
exists in case of Non-destructive combinations of 
protocols, which can be achieved by verification of 
properties of every individual protocols by adding the 
steps of other protocols (and vice versa) But not all the 
protocols implemented in composition are verified 
together, leading to the possibility of multi-protocol 
attack. As far as the verification of all protocols in a 
suite is assured to be secure, it is still not completely 
secure in composition [15]. 
 
Table 2. Protocol List 
 
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
 
Experiments from [6], shown in Table 2, addresses 
163 multi-protocol attacks. From a study of the 
literature, existence of multi-protocol attacks on 
protocols in large numbers is feasible. Cremers finds 
attacks that were previously unreported, which leads to 
a much larger threat than previously assumed [5], [6]. 
This is not limited to a small subset of the protocols. 
Out of the 30 protocols examined [6], 23 were found 
that had security claims that are correct in isolation but 
were susceptible to multi-protocol attacks. 
A survey of the literature also shows that multi-
protocol attacks exist now on combinations of 
protocols for which no attacks were known previously. 
Composition of protocols which claimed to be secure 
and have no attack, recently were found to have a 3-
protocol attack, as per the experiments conducted in 
[5].  Without tool support, it becomes harder to find 
such kinds of attacks. Feasibility of such attacks had 
been found using the formal models and tools, which 
helps to run large scale test cases. Single protocols can 
cause other protocols to be susceptible to malicious 
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attacks. Proof of correctness for a protocol in isolation 
is not sufficient to make the protocol secure, nor to 
justify the claim of security. Proof of correctness in 
composition should be tested before usage. 
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Appendix A: Scyther Tool 
 
We have specified the protocols and verified the 
feasibility of Multi-Protocol Attack using the Scyther 
Tool [20]. We give a brief description about the tool 
and results in the Appendix here. Scyther is an 
automated security protocol verification tool, which 
can verify protocols with an unbounded number of 
sessions and nonces. The semantics of protocol 
execution, security properties and input language are 
based on [7]. The algorithm used is an extended 
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version of the method used by the Athena tool by X.D. 
Song. Scyther tool is used because even when used 
with a bound on the number of sessions, it can decide 
(i.e. prove or disprove) a large class of protocols, 
Multi-protocol analysis is handled in an intuitive way 
(concatenation of input files.). It can verify ordering-
related properties such as synchronisation. Multiple 
key infrastructures (PKIs) can be modeled. 
 
Appendix B: Protocol Specifications 
 
 
/* ns3.spdl 
 * Needham-Schroeder protocol 
 */ 
 
// PKI infrastructure 
 
const pk: Function; 
secret sk: Function; 
inversekeys (pk,sk); 
 
// The protocol description 
 
protocol ns3(I,R) 
{ 
 role I 
 { 
  const ni: Nonce; 
  var nr: Nonce; 
 
  send_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) ); 
  read_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) ); 
  send_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) ); 
 
  claim_i1(I,Secret,ni); 
  claim_i2(I,Secret,nr); 
  claim_i3(I,Niagree); 
  claim_i4(I,Nisynch); 
 }  
  
 role R 
 { 
  var ni: Nonce; 
  const nr: Nonce; 
 
  read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) ); 
  send_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) ); 
  read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) ); 
 
  claim_r1(R,Secret,ni); 
  claim_r2(R,Secret,nr); 
  claim_r3(R,Niagree); 
  claim_r4(R,Nisynch); 
 } 
} 
 
// An untrusted agent, with leaked information 
 
const Eve: Agent; 
untrusted Eve; 
compromised sk(Eve); 
 
 
/* nsl3.spdl 
 * Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol 
 */ 
 
// PKI infrastructure 
 
const pk: Function; 
secret sk: Function; 
inversekeys (pk,sk); 
 
// The protocol description 
 
protocol nsl3(I,R) 
{ 
 role I 
 { 
  const ni: Nonce; 
  var nr: Nonce; 
 
  send_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) ); 
  read_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) ); 
  send_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) ); 
 
  claim_i1(I,Secret,ni); 
  claim_i2(I,Secret,nr); 
  claim_i3(I,Niagree); 
  claim_i4(I,Nisynch); 
 }  
  
 role R 
 { 
  var ni: Nonce; 
  const nr: Nonce; 
 
  read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) ); 
  send_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) ); 
  read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) ); 
 
  claim_r1(R,Secret,ni); 
  claim_r2(R,Secret,nr); 
  claim_r3(R,Niagree); 
  claim_r4(R,Nisynch); 
 } 
} 
 
// An untrusted agent, with leaked information 
 
const Eve: Agent; 
untrusted Eve; 
compromised sk(Eve); 
 
 
/* nsl3-broken.spdl 
 *Tailored Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol, 
 * broken version (wrong role name in first message) 
 */ 
 
// PKI infrastructure 
 
const pk: Function; 
secret sk: Function; 
inversekeys (pk,sk); 
 
// The protocol description 
 
 12 
protocol nsl3-broken(I,R) 
{ 
 role I 
 { 
  const ni: Nonce; 
  var nr: Nonce; 
 
  send_1(I,R, {R,ni}pk(R) ); 
  read_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) ); 
  send_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) ); 
 
  claim_i1(I,Secret,ni); 
  claim_i2(I,Secret,nr); 
  claim_i3(I,Niagree); 
  claim_i4(I,Nisynch); 
 }  
  
 role R 
 { 
  var ni: Nonce; 
  const nr: Nonce; 
 
  read_1(I,R, {R,ni}pk(R) ); 
  send_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) ); 
  read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) ); 
 
  claim_r1(R,Secret,ni); 
  claim_r2(R,Secret,nr); 
  claim_r3(R,Niagree); 
  claim_r4(R,Nisynch); 
 } 
} 
 
// An untrusted agent, with leaked information 
 
const Eve: Agent; 
untrusted Eve; 
compromised sk(Eve); 
 
Appendix C: Results of Verification 
 
Appendix B gives the protocol specification for the 
three protocols (Needham-Schroeder, Needham-
Schroeder-Lowe, and tailored Needham-Schroeder-
Lowe) which has been composed and verified using the 
Scyther tool. The result shows that the Multi-Protocol 
Attack is feasible in the composition. Also we have 
presented here one failed traces per protocol. 
 
PythonWin 2.4.3 - Enthought Edition 1.0. [MSC v.1310 32 bit 
(Intel)] on win32. 
Portions Copyright 1994-2004 Mark Hammond 
(mhammond@skippinet.com.au) - see 'Help/About PythonWin' for 
further copyright information. 
>>> Performing multi-protocol analysis for the following protocols: 
['nsl3-broken.spdl', 'ns3.spdl', 'nsl3.spdl'] 
 
Found multi-protocol attack on claim nsl3-broken,r3 in the context 
['nsl3-broken.spdl', 'ns3.spdl', 'nsl3.spdl']. 
 
Found multi-protocol attack on claim nsl3-broken,r4 in the context 
['nsl3-broken.spdl', 'ns3.spdl', 'nsl3.spdl']. 
 
Found multi-protocol attack on claim ns3,i1 in the context 
['ns3.spdl', 'nsl3-broken.spdl']. 
 
Found multi-protocol attack on claim ns3,i1 in the context 
['ns3.spdl', 'nsl3-broken.spdl', 'nsl3.spdl']. 
 
Found multi-protocol attack on claim ns3,i2 in the context 
['ns3.spdl', 'nsl3-broken.spdl']. 
 
Found multi-protocol attack on claim ns3,i2 in the context 
['ns3.spdl', 'nsl3-broken.spdl', 'nsl3.spdl']. 
 
Found multi-protocol attack on claim ns3,i3 in the context 
['ns3.spdl', 'nsl3-broken.spdl']. 
 
Found multi-protocol attack on claim ns3,i3 in the context 
['ns3.spdl', 'nsl3-broken.spdl', 'nsl3.spdl']. 
 
Found multi-protocol attack on claim ns3,i4 in the context 
['ns3.spdl', 'nsl3-broken.spdl']. 
 
Found multi-protocol attack on claim ns3,i4 in the context 
['ns3.spdl', 'nsl3-broken.spdl', 'nsl3.spdl']. 
 
Found multi-protocol attack on claim nsl3,i1 in the context 
['nsl3.spdl', 'nsl3-broken.spdl']. 
 
Found multi-protocol attack on claim nsl3,i1 in the context 
['nsl3.spdl', 'nsl3-broken.spdl', 'ns3.spdl']. 
 
Found multi-protocol attack on claim nsl3,i2 in the context 
['nsl3.spdl', 'nsl3-broken.spdl']. 
 
Found multi-protocol attack on claim nsl3,i2 in the context 
['nsl3.spdl', 'nsl3-broken.spdl', 'ns3.spdl']. 
 
Found multi-protocol attack on claim nsl3,i3 in the context 
['nsl3.spdl', 'nsl3-broken.spdl']. 
 
Found multi-protocol attack on claim nsl3,i3 in the context 
['nsl3.spdl', 'nsl3-broken.spdl', 'ns3.spdl']. 
 
Found multi-protocol attack on claim nsl3,i4 in the context 
['nsl3.spdl', 'nsl3-broken.spdl']. 
 
Found multi-protocol attack on claim nsl3,i4 in the context 
['nsl3.spdl', 'nsl3-broken.spdl', 'ns3.spdl']. 
 
Found multi-protocol attack on claim nsl3,r1 in the context 
['nsl3.spdl', 'nsl3-broken.spdl']. 
 
Found multi-protocol attack on claim nsl3,r1 in the context 
['nsl3.spdl', 'nsl3-broken.spdl', 'ns3.spdl']. 
 
Found multi-protocol attack on claim nsl3,r3 in the context 
['nsl3.spdl', 'nsl3-broken.spdl']. 
 
Found multi-protocol attack on claim nsl3,r3 in the context 
['nsl3.spdl', 'nsl3-broken.spdl', 'ns3.spdl']. 
 
Found multi-protocol attack on claim nsl3,r4 in the context 
['nsl3.spdl', 'nsl3-broken.spdl']. 
 
Found multi-protocol attack on claim nsl3,r4 in the context 
['nsl3.spdl', 'nsl3-broken.spdl', 'ns3.spdl']. 
Analysis complete. 
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Fig. 8. Results of the failed verification. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9. Trace for the Multi-Protocol attack on Needham-
Schroeder protocol against the claim r4. 
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Fig. 10. Trace for the Multi-Protocol attack on Needham-
Schroeder-Lowe protocol against the claim r3. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 11. Trace for the Multi-Protocol attack on Tailored 
Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol against the claim r1. 
 
 
